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LETTERS

Agony of the
innocents

March 7, 1998: An Iraqi woman moums at the tomb of her two-year-old daughter.

George Lopez and David Cortright's
article concerning the effect of sanctions on Iraq ("Pain and Promise," May/
June 1998) merits comment. Lopez
and Cortright underestimate the number of civilians who have died as a direct result of sanctions; a compelling
case could be made that the number
of deaths is much closer to a million.
Nonetheless, they make the point that
the number of innocents who have
died as a result of sanctions constitutes
an "appalling tragedy."
It was surprising, though, that Lopez
and Cortright did not follow their antisanctions argument to its logical conclusion: When dealing with a despotic
regime, broad economic sanctions are
bound to fail and should not be used.
Broad sanctions leave the target
regime intact while decimating the
civilian population, particularly when
the sanctions are not narrowly tailored
to achieve the desired goal.
The Iraqi regime that came to

power in 1968 has ruled with an efficient brutality worthy of Stalin. One
year after assuming the presidency,
Saddam Hussein entered into a war
against Iran that ultimately caused the
death of some 250,000 Iraqis. In 1988,
he ordered the use of poison gas
against Iraq's Kurdish civilians in Halabcha. The invasion of Kuwait came
two years later. This history should
not have made one sanguine about
the regime's concern for its citizens'
well-being.
Economic sanctions were first imposed in August 1990 as an alternative
to war. These same sanctions ostensibly became the instrument for insuring
the elimination of Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction only after the ceasefire in March 1991.
By then, Iraq had been bombed into
the pre-industrial era. Its electrical
grid, water-pumping stations, and
treatment plants were destroyed or
damaged. The response of the victori-

ous powers was to keep Iraq in a stranglehold. Ordinary Iraqis were now
subject to the good conduct of the
regime for their very survival.
The regime had two choices: either
cooperate in the destruction of its outlawed weapons programs (developed
over nearly two decades at the cost of
unknown billions), which would insure
that ordinary Iraqis would not go without; or, hang on to the outlawed
weapons regardless of the price ordinary Iraqis would have to pay. Given
Hussein's history, who would have
thought the question would even be
close?
Eight years later, the illogic of the
continuing sanctions would be laughable were it not tragic. The dual-use
doctrine, which bans the importation
of material with both civilian and military uses, is illustrative: Chemicals
needed for purification of drinking
water are banned, so Iraq's children
die from water-home diseases. Nitroglycerin used to treat cardiovascular
disease is banned, even though the
dosage is on the microgram scale. Because of sanctions, once solidly middle
class Iraqis now sell what is left of their
meager possessions for food. Iraq's prewar, Western-style health care system
no longer exists. The simplest medications Americans buy in any grocery
store, once ubiquitous, are a dim memory. Anesthetics and sutures are no
longer available or affordable. Equipment lies dormant in Iraqi hospitals.
But the situation is not equally bleak
for all Iraqis. Last year an assassination
attempt critically injured Saddam Hussein's son Uday. A team of French surgeons was flown into Baghdad. Uday,
who received the best of Western
medical care, is still very much alive. A
reasoned observer would ask: At
whom are the sanctions aimed, and
who is paying the price?
The fiction surrounding the oil-forfood arrangement begs comment.
Even if Iraq could meet the quotas of
U.N. Resolution 1153, it would gamer
only $1.00 worth of food and medical
supplies per person per day. Because
humanitarian goods must be purchased
overseas and shipped to Iraq, the conSee
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democratic forms of government are
still in an embryonic stage.
In the end, the uneasy and thus-far
peaceful coexistence of globalization
and democracy will not last long unless
several key measures are taken. Longworth suggests imposing the "Tobin
tax," a tax of 0.1 percent on all foreign
exchange transactions to slow the global flow of speculative hot money. This
is an ingenious proposal that would
rein in the world's volatile capital markets, where investors resemble the
hunters of woolly mammoths, stalking
their prey as they move from one venture to another-a metaphor employed by various writers that Longworth cites. In their hunt, these fund
managers destabilize currencies, disrupt relative prices, and bring havoc to
economic systems.
Another measure, which would
spark much more controversy, would
be the creation of a global central
bank--or something similar-to stabilize the major currencies. Finally,
he proposes uniform rules for taxation, accounting practices, and transaction codes in the securities and
stock markets.
Longworth is right when he calls for
a new Bretton Woods-type conference
to set up rules for global economic coordination. But the nations of the socalled Third World must be integrated
into these arrangements. Global security depends on it. •

Alejandro Nadal is a professor of economics at El Colegio de Mexico in
Mexico City and a member of the Bulletins Board of Directors.
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elusion is obvious. This arrangement is
a cruel hoax, designed to ameliorate
the conscience of the victorious powers. Even State Department officials
acknowledge that the program was
never intended to meet the minimal
needs of Iraq's devastated population.
Maintaining economic sanctions is
no longer a rational policy. Instead, it
has become a mantra devoid of reason:
"Sanctions will not be lifted until Iraq
is in full compliance with all Security
Council resolutions." Recently, Cong.
Lee Hamilton asked Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk to define
"full compliance." Tired of hearing the
mantra, Hamilton finally had to "demand" that Indyk answer the question.
Unable to articulate an answer, Indyk
responded that he would have to reply
later in writing.
Despite their harshness and their
duration, sanctions will not eliminate
Iraq's outlawed weapons. State Department and Pentagon officials have
conceded that, at best, the chemical
and biological programs will have been
temporarily delayed. There is thus no
nexus between economic sanctions
and the U.S. policy of "eliminating"
the banned weapons programs. That
being so, there is absolutely no justification for prolonging the agony of the
innocents.
Military sanctions, including inspections, are another matter. They should
be maintained so long as the Ba'athist
regime, which is a menace to its own
people as well as to its neighbors, is in
power. Meanwhile, only deterrence
has been proven to be effective against
Hussein. The only civilian population
he used these outlawed weapons
against were the Kurds, who could not
retaliate. During the Iran-Iraq war,
poison gas was exchanged on the battlefield, but neither side used such
weapons against the other's population
centers. Iraq could have used its outlawed weapons again in the 1991 war,
but, mindful of the consequences, it
did not.
As the foregoing was being written,
proof of the fallacy of economic sanctions emerged. Just as there were serious discussions yet again that the sane-

tions might be lifted at the end of the
year, the U.N. Special Commission
found evidence that Iraq had "weaponized" its poison gas program-that it
had loaded missiles with vx-something the regime had been denying for
eight years.
The sanctions against Iraq have
been the most crippling and effective
sanctions imposed in the history of the
United Nations, and their consequences will be felt for generations.
Yet they have not caused the regime to
be forthcoming, because the regime is
virtually immune from their effects.
State Department officials repeat the
mantra while Hussein remains callously indifferent to the suffering of his
own people. There is thus a perverse
complicity between the United States
and Hussein in perpetrating a genocide on Iraq's population.
Far from constituting the basis for a
gradual lifting of sanctions as advocated by Lopez and Cortright, these facts
demand an immediate cessation of
economic sanctions aimed so pointlessly at Iraq's suffering masses. In the
end, economic sanctions against Iraq
have been shown to be a weapon of
mass destruction, akin to a neutron
bomb, extracting hellish, torturous
punishment of innocents, but leaving
Saddam Hussein free to build palaces
and play hide-and-seek with the world.

Feisal Amin al-Istrahadi
Merrillville, Indiana

Look to the army
The July/August issue, which looked at
the Indian/Pakistani nuclear tests, was
good. Here, I add just a footnote.
A week after the May 11 Indian
tests, Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif was asked why
Pakistan had not tested. He answered:
''Why we are not testing this capability
is because of the fact I want to show
the world that Pakistan is a responsible
country. . . . If India is doing it out of
sheer madness, we do not have to
blindly follow suit."
Less than two weeks later, Pakistan
tested. Why did this strong, thoughtful
man finally make the decision to au-

